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INTRODUCTION
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: RIGHTS AND
RISKS TO VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Washington v. GlucksbergI that a state law criminalizing physician-
assisted suicide did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,2 and in
Vacco v. QuilP that such a law did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.4 This Symposium was
held on February 26, 1997, after the Supreme Court had heard oral
arguments in Glucksberg and Quill, but before the Court had de-
cided these cases. The effect of these decisions is to place in a dif-
ferent posture many of the contributions to this panel on physician-
assisted suicide. The most relevant issue is no longer the constitu-
tional status of the alleged right to physician-assisted suicide. The
Court has decided, at least for the moment,5 that there is no consti-
tutional right to physician-assisted suicide, and that, therefore, each
state may decide for itself how to accommodate the legal and ethi-
cal concerns fueling the debate over physician-assisted suicide.
The effect of these decisions is not, however, to foreclose debate on
the issues raised at our Symposium concerning physician-assisted
suicide. On the contrary, these issues now become vitally impor-
tant at a different level, for each state is now charged with the priv-
ilege and the responsibility of deciding how to design its laws
regarding individual decisionmaking at the end of life.
The array of approaches that states may take to these problems
is illustrated by, at one end of the spectrum, the laws in Glucksberg
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1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2. Id. at 2261.
3. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
4. Id. at 2296.
5. See Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 40 (arguing that careful analysis of individual justices' votes
and opinions suggests that "the Court might well change its mind in a future case
when more evidence of the practical impact of any such right was available.").
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and Quill that forbid physician-assisted suicide, and at the other
end of the spectrum, Lee v. State of Oregon,6 in which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals declined (on procedural grounds) to
strike down an Oregon statute that expressly permits physician-as-
sisted suicide under some conditions. 7 The Supreme Court re-
cently denied the certiorari petition in Lee,8 effectively allowing
Oregon's permissive physician-assisted suicide statute to stand.9
Today, states have ample decisionmaking authority in the assisted
suicide area.
The title of this panel of the Symposium is Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Rights and Risks to Vulnerable Communities. Within the
past few decades, advocates for the poor and disempowered have
engaged in civil rights crusades typically aimed, in part, at dimin-
ishing the state's ability to cut off certain avenues of choice for in-
dividuals; voting rights, educational rights, and employment rights
are examples of this movement, and reproductive rights are obvi-
ously the most contentious example. At first blush, the alleged
right to control the circumstances of one's own death and suffering
would come within the ambit of these concerns, which are rooted
in autonomy, liberty, and equality. Many civil rights organizations,
and many fine scholars, including two of the contributors to this
symposium-Professor Alan Meisel and Professor James Flem-
ing- adopt roughly this position, and this was clearly part of what
animated the thinking of the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeals (in the decisions reversed by the Supreme
Court), and the state of Oregon in its statute permitting physician-
assisted suicide.
On the other hand, numerous advocates for the poor and dis-
abled have taken the opposite view, and they too have been joined
by eloquent scholarly voices, including four on our panel-Ellen
Moskowitz, Esq., Professor and Rabbi David Bleich, Professor
Cheryl Mwaria, and Professor Norton Spritz. Their concerns are
diverse, but in significant part derive from the belief that the legali-
zation of physician-assisted suicide would in fact create intolerable
risks, particularly to those in our community who are most vulnera-
ble: the poor, the elderly, and the mentally and physically disabled
or ill. These very concerns were cited by the Supreme Court in
6. 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
7. Id. at 1391.
8. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997).
9. See also David J. Garlow, The Oregon Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A31
(Oregon voters chose not to repeal law permitting physician-assisted suicide).
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Glucksberg' and Quill" as a legitimate reason for state regulation
of physician-assisted suicide.
As the debate now moves fully into the state legislatures and
courts, we may hope that the proponents of both of these points of
view will speak as clearly and cogently as the contributors to our
panel have spoken.
10. 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997).
11. 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997).
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